Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
All Graduate Plan B and other Reports

Graduate Studies

12-2018

Corn Exports Extrication
Claire Hutchins
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Hutchins, Claire, "Corn Exports Extrication" (2018). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 1346.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1346

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and
other Reports by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu.

CORN EXPORTS EXTRICATION
by
Claire Hutchins
A research paper submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
Applied Economics

Approved:

_______________________________
Dillon Feuz, Ph.D.
Major Professor

______________________________
Ryan Bosworth, Ph.D.
Committee Member

_______________________________
Ryan Larsen, Ph.D.
Committee Member

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah
2018

Corn Exports
Extrication:
A new analysis of demand factors
driving the U.S. corn market
between 1997 and 2018

By: Claire Hutchins
Master of Science Candidate

Utah State University,
Department of Applied Economics

Plan B Paper

November 15, 2018

Table of Contents
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

Abstract
3
Summary
3
Background
4
Literature Review
9
Corn Price Model (1999)
10
Corn Price Model (1999) Results and Properties
12
Corn Price Model (1999) Variable Renovation for Modern
Analysis
15
VIII. Corn Price Model (2018)
16
IX. Corn Price Model (2018) Results and Properties
19
X. Conclusion
23
XI. Future Research
24
XII. References
25

2

I.

Abstract

Annual corn exports, as a percentage of total use, exhibit a persistent, downward trend starting in
the mid-1970s. Changes in government policy and domestic supply-demand dynamics are widely
held as the determinants for corn price movement over the same period. However, significant
disputes have emerged since 2013 which attribute the last five years of corn market
underperformance to minor trade vicissitudes between the U.S. and China. This report estimates a
corn price determination model which demonstrates that foreign exports play an insignificant role
in the U.S. corn market between 1997 and 2018.

II.

Summary

This report builds on a corn price model estimated by USDA economists Westcott and Hoffman
(1999). The initial model estimates the log of the annual average price of U.S. corn as a function
of the log of the ending stocks-to-use ratio, the government owned stocks-to-use ratio, the log of
the commodity loan rate by year, and a 1986 dummy variable. The 1999 model captures significant
changes in the domestic corn market across two decades of evolving U.S. agriculture policy. While
the initial model delivers sound results for the decades in question, it is not sufficient to estimate
corn price dynamics well into the 21st century. The purpose of this report is to update the 1999
model and to extend its descriptive power into the polemics of a modern era.
Specifically, the new model extricates corn exports as a key explanatory variable for domestic
price movements between 1975 and 1996, but will demonstrate the relative insignificance of the
effect of exports on the annual average cash price for corn between 1997 and 2018. This argument
builds on the basic observation that corn exports comprise an increasingly small percentage of
total U.S. consumption each year, and vary little therein. Even within the temporal bounds of
Westcott and Hoffman’s paper, corn exports fell from 33 percent of total use in 1975 to 21 percent
in 1996. By 2017, corn exports comprised only 15 percent of total use. This report details the shift
in the significance of the effect of corn exports on annual cash price by estimating both models
across two time periods: 1975 to 1996 (when exports were significant) and 1997 to 2018 (when
exports lost their significance). Additionally, the new model introduces a renewable fuels variable
which captures significant changes in U.S. agriculture policy after 2005.
The new model could be used moving forward to address trade disputes where corn exports are
concerned—primarily to demonstrate that trade shocks between the U.S. and its export partners
(especially its minor export partners) have insignificant, non-pervasive effects on farm level prices.
Ultimately, this report confirms the enduring strength of the 1999 model as a foundation for
modern corn price analysis and builds upon it to address contemporary issues in U.S. agriculture.
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III. Background
The new model estimates the log of the average annual price of corn (ln p) between 1975 and 2018
as a function of six independent variables. Four of the independent variables are either borrowed
or derived from Westcott and Hoffman’s 1999 model. Two new variables capture the log of the
exports-to-use ratio and the renewable fuels mandate introduced in 2005. Of the six variables, four
directly address U.S. agriculture policy changes (as they pertain to the corn market) between 1975
and 2018 and two directly address corn’s evolving supply and demand dynamics over the same
period.

U.S. Agriculture Policy Changes between 1975 and 2018
Four U.S. farm programs dominate the corn marketing landscape between 1975 and 2018: the loan
rate program, the Farmer Owned Reserve program, the marketing loan program, and the ethanol
mandate. Changes to these programs illustrate the evolving role of the U.S. government in corn
price determination over the past four decades.
In the late 1970s, the government increased loan rates for corn which remained relatively high
through the mid-1980s. Collateral stocks overwhelmed government stores as a growing body of
farmers defaulted on their loans. By 1982, government-owned stocks reached 1.1 billion bushels—
or 16 percent of total annual use. Historically, increased government-reserves have a positive effect
on price as they restrict the market’s ability to access any given commodity. In addition to the high
loan rate, government storage subsidies to farmers between 1977 and 1982 encouraged farmers to
withhold their grain from the market until the average farm price reached a certain release floor.
Stocks were held in the Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) or by the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC). High loan rates and storage subsidies, coupled with additional price supports of the era,
increased the government-facilitated storage level for corn to 1.9 billion bushels in 1982—nearly
26 percent of total use.
After 1986, significant measures were taken to reduce the interference of these programs with corn
price determination. Loan rates were sharply reduced, corn harvested between 1986 and 1990 was
not allowed into the FOR, and existing grain reserves were made more available to the
marketplace. These program changes were ultimately successful as government-owned and FOR
stocks fell from a combined 3 billion bushels in 1987 to 400 million bushels by 1991, and total
corn stocks fell from 4 billion bushels to 1.5 billion bushels over the same period (Westcott and
Hoffman, 1999).
Continued policy changes through the early 1990s ensured the decreasing role that government
price support and community storage programs played in the domestic corn market. The 1990
Farm Act further increased the availability of FOR stocks to the marketplace and the 1996 Farm
Act officially suspended FOR and encouraged marketing loans which minimized the debt
obligations of corn producers. Under the marketing loan program, farmers could repay their debt
at rates lower than the original value of the loan if market prices dipped below a certain level—
4

thus relieving the government of its obligation to collect vast stores of product. The late 1990s
marked the government’s determined exit from its domestic agricultural markets. Governmentowned stocks were reduced to 4 million bushels in 1997, and had completely disappeared by 2005
(Kansas State University, 2018).
Following its initial retreat from the market in the late 1980s, the government swiftly and
successfully recused itself as market proprietor by the early 2000s. At that point, prices for corn
were instead determined almost exclusively by annual supply and demand conditions (USDA,
Corn Trade). Demand conditions changed dramatically in 2005 after the Environmental Protection
Agency hit the domestic corn market with a pervasive demand hike by way of the Renewable Fuels
Standard (RFS). RFS, also known as the ethanol mandate, requires that transportation fuel sold in
the U.S. contain a minimum volume of renewable fuels. The standard requires that an aggregate
maximum of 15 billion gallons of corn-based ethanol and 21 billion gallons of non-corn biofuels
supplement the nation’s fuel supply by 2022 (Loris, 2013). Revised in 2007, the second Renewable
Fuels Standard (RFS2) scheduled the maximum ethanol production to increase more quickly each
year until it hit the 15 billion gallon ceiling by as early as 2015. However, the 15 billion gallon
corn-ethanol target was reduced in late 2014 and the ceiling hovers today at around 14.5 billion
gallons per annum (Beckman and Nigatu, 2017).

Supply Factors for Corn
Corn supply has increased steadily since the mid-1970s. Higher yields followed improvements in
technology and production practices; and total supply increased from 6,400 million bushels in
1975 to an estimated 16,900 million bushels in 2018. Farm policy also relaxed through this era
which allowed farmers to plant according to market conditions rather than government mandates.
The government imposed corn acreage restriction of 60.2 million in the early 1980s, but relaxed
these restrictions in the 1996 Farm Bill. Responding to market conditions, U.S. farmers planted
more than 90 million acres of corn in 2015 alone (USDA, Corn and Other Feed Grains:
Background).

Demand Factors for Corn
Between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s, government stores comprised a significant portion of
domestic corn demand. Over time, domestic consumption rose from 69 percent of total use by
1980 to 79 percent of total use by 1996. Although government programs like FOR and CCC
completely disappeared by the early 2000s, domestic consumption continued to increase relative
to total disappearance. By 2017, domestic consumption comprised more than 85 percent of total
corn use. The hike in domestic consumption is largely attributed to the ethanol mandates
established between 2005 and 2007. In 2018, total corn use reached 14,830 million bushels. Corn
use for food, seed, and (non-ethanol) industrials (FSI) totaled 1,480 million bushels, use for fuelethanol totaled 5,625 million bushels, use for feed and residual totaled 5,425 million bushels, and
use for exports totaled 2,300 million bushels. (Figure 1)
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All categories except corn use for fuel-ethanol maintain relatively constant levels (in absolute
value) between 1980 and 2018. However, proportional to total use, both feed and residual use and
exports fall considerably by 2018. (Figure 2) The former falls from nearly 60 percent of total use
in 1980 to nearly 30 percent of total use by 2018, while FSI maintains a steady 10 percent of total
use. Ethanol is clearly the largest positive disruption to the corn market in the past 40 years,
exploding from zero percent of total use in 1980 to 38 percent by 2018.

Export Demand for U.S. Corn
The U.S. is the world’s largest producer and exporter of corn. However, the importance of corn
exports to the U.S. economy has decreased over time. Corn export demand soared in the 1970s
due to strong demand from Russia, Japan, and other European countries, but fell off in the mid
1980s due to poor global economic growth and domestic price support policies. Exports increased
between the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the reduction in government support programs, but
dropped again with the dissipation of the former Soviet Union and rising Chinese corn exports.
Record domestic demand for corn ethanol around 2008 put considerable pressure on U.S. exports.
At this time, Brazil emerged as a significant rival in the global export market, though the U.S.
regained its predominance following 2008. Though the U.S. is the largest exporter of corn in the
world (maintaining around 40 of global market share), export demand ranks relatively low
compared to other major domestic use categories. This means that corn prices are largely
determined by supply and demand factors within the U.S. market itself. While foreign demand for
U.S. corn by countries like Mexico, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China has generally
increased since the 1980s (notwithstanding significant trade events), U.S. exports as a percentage
of total use have continued to decline. (USDA, Corn and Other Feed Grains: Trade)
China’s Demand for U.S. Corn
The U.S.’s corn trade relationship with China has garnered significant attention over the past five
years. Significantly, in late 2013, record farm-level prices (around $7 per bushel) plummeted to a
pervasive $4 per bushel, from which they have yet to recover. In November 2013, China
announced an indefinite moratorium on corn imports from the U.S. following the discovery of an
unapproved genetic trait in DDGS shipments several months prior.
Many agricultural organizations including the National Feed Grain Association (NGFA) and the
North American Export Grain Association (NAEGA) blamed the drop in U.S. price on the trade
event (Fisher, 2014). However, U.S. exports to China peaked in 2012 (at 5.2 million tons), and
suffered their largest drop between 2012 and 2013 from 5.2 million tons to 2.78 million tons. At
the height of their corn trade relationship in 2012, 12 percent of U.S. corn exports went to China.
In 2012, total exports comprised only 14 percent of total use in the U.S.—which implies that, at
its height, U.S. exports to China comprised only 1.7 percent of total use. After the U.S. lost access
China’s corn market in 2014, corn exports were redirected to developing markets like Columbia
and Peru. Ultimately, U.S. corn exports to the world increased from 730 million bushels (following
the U.S. drought in 2012) in MY 2012/2013 to 1,920 million bushels in MY 2013/2014. (Figure
1)
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In sum, U.S. exports dominate the global stage, but U.S. exports are not significant determinants
for domestic farm-level prices. Commodity groups blamed the prolonged collapse in farm level
prices on a trade event between the U.S. and China in late 2013, but at the height of this corn trade
relationship, China was not the primary or even the secondary export destination for U.S. corn (the
honor at the time belonged to Mexico and Japan, respectively).
The following analysis builds on a sound corn price determination model developed by Westcott
and Hoffman (1999) and demonstrates that U.S. corn exports as a whole (not just to a specific
destination) played a statistically insignificant role in annual farm-level prices after 1996.
Ultimately, the results of this analysis undermine the previous reports by agricultural groups like
the NGFA which blamed the pervasive collapse of the corn market following 2013 on a trade
disturbance between the U.S. and China.

7

Figure 3: U.S. Corn Exports by Major Destination (% Total Exports)
(USDA ERS, 2018)
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IV.

Literature Review

Van Meir (1983) and Baker and Menzie (1988) analyze annual corn price as a function of the year
end stocks-to-use ratio. Westcott and Hoffman (1999) expand Van Meir’s model to capture
changes in government policy between 1975 and 1996. Schaffer (2004) expands Westcott and
Hoffman’s model with behavioral variables (like response to weather and trade events in the
1970s) to explain the low corn price phenomenon of the early 2000s. Good and Irwin (2015)
determine the U.S. stocks-to-use ratio a more accurate determinant of corn price than the global
stocks-to-use ratio.
Whittaker (2013) argues that the effect of increased domestic ethanol use on corn price between
2005 and 2013 was overshadowed by the effect of the strength of the U.S. dollar during the same
period. Gilbert (2017) determines instead that increased demand for biofuels was the major driver
of grain prices between 2005 and 2017. Whittaker and Gilbert both suggest that increased biofuels
use affected corn price, but that increased biofuels use could not explain the extreme peaks in corn
price since 2005. Conversely, Zulauf (2016) determines that explosive growth in the ethanol
industry drove the extreme highs in price for the period in question.
Beyond the “price as a function of stocks-to-use” framework, many scholars examine the inverse
relationship, or demand for corn as a function of price. Davidson and Arnade (1987) determine
U.S. corn price and importers’ corn production to be major demand determinants for U.S. corn.
Park and Fortenbery (2007) use quarterly data to analyze effects of corn price on food, alcohol,
and industrial (FAI) demand, feed demand, and export demand between 1995 and 2007 and
conclude that increased demand from FAI, i.e. ethanol, explains corn price movement better than
the other use categories.
Reimer, et al. (2012) provide new estimates of the U.S. foreign export demand elasticity for corn
and other commodities between 2001 and 2011. Saighaian, et al. (2014) determine corn export
demand elasticity to China to be significant and relatively inelastic compared to corn export
demand elasticity to Japan and the E.U. (other significant export markets)—which yield
insignificant results. Debnath, et al. (2014) measure export demand for wheat and corn in
developing markets and suggest that corn export demand becomes less elastic over time compared
to wheat export demand. Gilbert (2017) also determines corn market elasticities to be lower than
wheat market elasticities, but suggests that supply shocks more than demand shocks affect corn
price on an annual basis.
This report adds to the literature a new interpretation of corn price as a function of the classic
stocks-to-use ratio. Specifically, it adds a new export variable to the 1999 model which captures
the shifting significance of corn exports on corn price between 1975 and 2018. This report supports
the structural framework established by Van Meir (1983) , Westcott and Hoffman (1999), and
Schaffer (2004), while it contradicts Whittaker’s (2013) suggestion that exports (as an extension
of the strength of the U.S. dollar) significantly affect the price of corn between 1996 and 2018.
Broadly, it stands to reason that domestic price negatively affects foreign demand for U.S. corn
(as suggested by Park and Fortenbery (2007) and Reimer, et al. (2012)).
However, this report calls into question the significance of the inverse of this relationship, that is:
the effect of exports (as a proxy for foreign demand) on domestic price.
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V.

Corn Price Model (1999)

Westcott and Hoffman relate price as a function of ending stocks based on an existing equilibrium
model for competitive markets with inventories (Labys, 1973) where supply equals demand plus
stocks (equations 1-4):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

S = f (pt-1, z)
D = g (p, pt-1, z)
K = h (p, z)
S–D–K=0

Lagged price (pt-1) drives supply and demand in the current period. However, current price (p) and
a vector of exogenous variables (z) are the only determinants of stocks (K) in the current period.
Building on this assumption, Westcott and Hoffman conclude “in equilibrium, prices can be
determined from the inverse of the stocks function. This provides a price determination equation,
with prices negatively related to stocks.” (p. 12)
(5) p = h-1 (K, z)
The authors incorporate into the original stocks function (equation 3) two additional terms to
capture the commodity loan rate program (LR) and government owned stocks (CCC):
(3a) K = h (p, LR, CCC, z)
The inverse of this function, price as a function of stocks, government stocks, loan rate, and z is
shown in equation 5a:
(5a) p = h-1 (K, CCC, LR, z)
The functional form used to estimate equation 5a, which relates annual price of corn to its stocksto-use variables, is logarithmic (double-log). This function form provides a downward-sloping,
convex-shaped relationship between the stocks-to-use ratio and price. To avoid problems
encountered in previous corn sector simulations, the authors do not transform the governmentowned stocks variable (CCC) to logarithms. Otherwise, the authors do take the log of stocks (K)
and of the loan rate (LR).
The 1999 model specified in equation 6 provides a basic relationship between prices (p), the total
stocks to use ratio (K/U), and the other independent variables. It was estimated using annual
(marketing year) data for 1975 to 1996.

Corn price model (1999):
(6) Ln (p) = a + b Ln (K/U) + c (CCC/U) + d Ln (LR) * Dum7885 + e Dum86
Where p represents the annual farm-level price for corn; K is total stocks; U represents annual
utilization of the crop; CCC represents government-owned stocks; LR is the commodity loan rate;
Dum7885 represents a dummy variable equal to 1 in 1978-1985 and equal to 0 in other years; and
Dum86 represents a dummy variable equal to 1 in 1986 and equal to 0 in other years. Full variable
definitions are summarized in table 1.
Notably, only the interaction between the commodity loan rate (LR) and the time dummy
(Dum7885) appear in the original model. To address the absence of a true time dummy for this
period, we re-estimated the original model as the previous authors did (without a standalone
Dum7885 variable) and re-estimated it again, adding a fifth standalone Dum7885 variable to the
four original variables. The second re-estimation, with five variables, produced a lower adjusted
R Square (.81) than the first re-estimation with four variables (.82). Not only did the adjusted R
Square decrease, but the coefficient for the new standalone Dum7885 variable was not statistically
significant from zero (p-value = .62). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that
including a standalone Dum7885 variable in addition to the four original variables does not add
meaningful information to the original model. These re-estimations substantiate Westcott and
Hoffman’s decision to omit a standalone time dummy variable from the original model; true to the
underlying structure of the original model, no standalone time dummy variables will be added to
the updated corn price determination models moving forward.

Corn Price Model (1999) Expectations
Total stocks (K) and government stocks (CCC) are measured relative to an indicator of the “scale
of activity” in the sector—represented by the ratio of each variable to the realized level of demand,
or actual use (U). The expected sign of the total stocks-to-use (K/U) coefficient (b) is negative. As
total supply increases relative to demand, we expect price to drop and vice versa. Conversely, a
larger government stocks-to-use ratio (CCC/U) at the end of the year indicates that fewer stocks
are available in the marketplace, resulting in higher prices. Thus the expected sign of the
coefficient for the government stocks-to-use ratio (c) is positive. The commodity loan program
(LR) had a significant influence on corn price levels between 1978 and 1985. The expected sign
of the coefficient (d) for the loan rate interaction term is therefore positive. Finally, the authors
include a 1986 dummy variable (Dum86) because preliminary tests without the dummy suggested
that 1986 had a strong, positive influence on the model’s other parameter estimates. This follows
intuition that government price support policies underwent significant reductions at this time. The
additional dummy eliminates the significant, implicit influence of 1986 on both the loan rate and
government stocks variables. The expected sign of the coefficient on the 1986 dummy is negative,
as this moment in time marks a shift away from high price supports toward a more market-oriented
agricultural economy.
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Table 1: Corn Price Model (1999) Summary of Variable Definitions
Variable Name

Definition

CCC
CCC/U
Dum7885
Dum86
K
K/U
LR
p
U

Government-owned stocks for corn
Government-owned Stocks relative to total use
Dummy variable equal to 1 in 1978-85 and equal to 0 in other years
Dummy variable equal to 1 in 1986 and equal to 0 in other years
Total year-ending U.S. stocks for corn
U.S. stocks-to-use ratio
Commodity loan rate for corn
Annual average farm level price for corn
Annual U.S. utilization, including exports

VI.

Corn Price Model (1999) Results and Properties

Corn Price Model (1999) Results and Properties
Westcott and Hoffman estimate the corn price model with annual marketing data from 1975
through 1996 using ordinary least squares in SAS (SAS institute). The results from their estimation
are reported in table 2.
Corn Price Model (1999) Re-Estimation
This report recreates the 1999 model using USDA annual marketing data from 1975 through 1996
collected through the Kansas State University Department of Agricultural Economics. The model
is re-estimated using ordinary least squares in Excel. The results from the re-estimation are
reported in table 3.
Corn Price Model (1999) Original Estimation and Re-Estimation Comparison
For brevity, the results from the original model estimation and original model re-estimation are
reported in table 4. The authors report an R Square of .908 and the re-estimation delivers an R
Square of .9075. This confirms that nearly 91 percent of the variation in corn prices between 1975
and 1996 can be explained by the behavior of the four explanatory variables over the same time
period. The authors report “statistical significance at the 1 percent level” for all explanatory
variables, but do not include specific statistical results for cross-comparison with the re-estimation.
The expected signs of the coefficients for each variable are confirmed in both corn price
estimations. The only serious discrepancy between the two estimations occurs in the magnitude of
the price effect of the government stocks-to-use ratio (CCC/U). The original estimation delivers
an increased corn price of .0149 percent given a one unit increase in the government stocks-to-use
ratio, while the new estimation delivers an increased corn price of 1.589 percent given a one-unit
increase in the government stocks-to-use ratio. While the magnitude difference of these
coefficients is significant, it could also be explained by transformational discrepancies between
both estimations.

Both estimations produce nearly identical results. This confirms the strength of the 1999 model as
a foundation for modern corn price analysis. It also confirms the legitimacy of the explanatory
variables which will be included in the new model.

Table 2: Corn Price Model (1999) Original Estimation Results 1975 – 1996
Regression Statistics
R Square

.908

F-value

41.812

Standard Error

.0583

Durbin-Watson

1.93

Coefficients

Significance

1.619

“at the 1 percent level”

Ln K/U

- 0.2813

“at the 1 percent level”

CCC/U

0.0149

“at the 1 percent level”

Ln (LR) * Dum7885

0.2269

“at the 1 percent level”

- 0.3256

“at the 1 percent level”

(Intercept)

Dum86
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Table 3: Corn Price Model (1999) Re-Estimation Results 1975 – 1996

Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.95263665

R Square

0.90751658

Adjusted R Square

0.88575577

Standard Error

0.05814558

Observations

22

ANOVA
df
Regression

SS

MS

F
41.7041818

4

0.56399213

0.14099803

Residual

17

0.05747545

0.00338091

Total

21

0.62146758

Coefficients

Standard
Error

Significance F

t Stat

P-value

1.4183E-08

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

Lower
95.0%

Upper 95.0%

Intercept ***

0.31900605

0.06773575

4.70956722

0.00020206

0.17609612

0.46191598

0.17609612

0.46191598

Ln (K/U) ***

-0.2833656

0.03297195

-8.5941411

1.3579E-07

-0.3529303

-0.2138008

-0.3529303

-0.2138008

CCC/U ***

1.58957386

0.48149093

3.30135785

0.00421772

0.5737168

2.60543093

0.5737168

2.60543093

Ln (LR) * Dum7885 ***

0.2316144

0.03438026

6.73684314

3.482E-06

0.1590784

0.3041504

0.1590784

0.3041504

Dum 86 ***

-0.341377

0.08808033

-3.8757458

0.00121392

-0.5272102

-0.1555437

-0.5272102

-0.1555437

*** If the p-value is < 1%
** If the p-value is < 5%
* If the p-value is < 10%
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Table 4: Corn Price Model (1999) Original Estimation and Re-Estimation Results
Original

Re-Estimation

.908

.908

R Square
Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients

p-value

Intercept

1.619

“at 1% level”

0.31900605

0.00020206

Ln (K/U)

-0.2813

“at 1% level”

-0.2833656

1.3579E-07

CCC/U

.0149

“at 1% level”

1.58957386

0.00421772

Ln (LR) * Dum 7885

0.2269

“at 1% level”

0.2316144

3.482E-06

Dum86

-0.3256

“at 1% level”

-0.341377

0.00121392

VII. Corn Price Model (1999) Variable Renovation for Modern Analysis
A primary goal of this report is to examine corn price behavior between 1975 and 2018. While
recognizing the strength of the 1999 model between 1975 and 1996, it is important to consider
new policy and supply-and-demand dynamics influencing the corn market since 1997. The main
goal of this report is to demonstrate that corn exports play an insignificant role in annual corn price
behavior between 1997 and 2018. One could simply build another log-log price model for the latter
period, but such a narrow temporal span would ignore the big shift in U.S. corn trade dynamics
from the late 20th century to now. That is to say, it is demonstrably true that exports played a
significant role in the corn market between 1975 and 1996. Westcott and Hoffman say as much in
the background to their1999 analysis:
Corn exports averaged 21 percent of total U.S. corn consumption in 1990-96, compared with an average of
31 percent in 1975-80. In fiscal 1996, corn exports accounted for 14 percent of the total value of U.S.
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agricultural exports, or $8.4 billion. The United States is the world’s largest exporter of corn, with a world
market share averaging over 70 percent in 1990-96. (p. 6)

However, the authors include exports as an implicit variable in the original estimation. They define
corn use (U) as “annual utilization including exports” which implicitly renders (U) a function of
domestic utilization (DU) and exports (EX), shown in equation 7. Domestic use (DU) is itself a
function of food, seed, and industrial use (FSI) and feed and residual use (FR), shown in equation
8.
(7) U = f (DU, EX)
(8) DU = h (FSI, FR)
The implicit inclusion of exports makes sense given the authors’ original purpose—to demonstrate
the significant role of the commodity loan rate program (LR) and government owned stocks (CCC)
on the price of corn between 1975 and 1996.
A new model which aims to demonstrate the evolving roll of exports in the corn market must
therefore extricate exports from the original use function. Significantly, the new model builds on
the 1999 model and aims to preserve its original intent as much as its statistical significance
moving forward. Additional and amended variables will therefore enhance the 1999 model in its
original context and will extend its analytical influence into the modern era.
The new model includes six explanatory variables in total. Two variables appear exactly as they
do in the 1999 estimation, one variable undergoes a semantic transformation, the inverse of one
variable becomes two separate variables, and the final variable is altogether new. (Table 5)
illustrates the new model variable transformation.

I.

Corn Price Model (2018)

The new model, specified in equation 9, provides a basic relationship between prices (p), the total
domestic use-to-stocks ratio (DU/K), the exports-to-stocks ratio (EX/K), the renewable fuels
standard (RFS), and other independent variables. It was estimated three separate times using
USDA annual marketing data from 1975 to 1996, 1997 to 2018, and from 1975 to 2018. Results
from Chow’s test justify breaking the combined regression (from 1975 to 2018) into two separate
regressions over two time periods: from 1975 to 1996, and from 1997 to 2018. Chow’s test delivers
a test statistic of 2.2796 where the critical value at the 10 percent level equals 1.926. Because the
test statistic exceeds the F-test critical value, we assume a legitimate break to exist at this point.
Further tests are needed to determine the exact point at which to break the model, but sufficient
evidence from history suggests that the late 1990s is a compelling place to start—given the nearly
complete recusal of the U.S. government from the corn markets after the 1996 Farm Bill. Even if
different significant breaks were discovered by repeated applications of Chow’s test over different
time intervals, it is presumed a significant break would certainly occur between 1997 and 2005.
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Table 5: New Model Variable Transformations
Original Variable

New Variable

Transformation

LR * Dum7885

LR * Dum7885

–

Dum 86

Dum 86

–

CCC/U

CCC * Dum7596

1.

2.
3.

K/U

DU/K

1.

Removing (U) from the (CCC/U) ratio simplifies the mathematical
interpretation of “the derivative of annual corn price with respect to exports
(as a component of use)”
(CCC) on its own still captures the semantic relevance of government stocks,
only the magnitude of the coefficient is expected to change
Because (CCC) are significantly phased out by 1996, a time dummy is added
which marries the variable to the Westcott and Hoffman era (1975 – 1996)

3.

The inverse of (K/U), or (U/K), still captures all relevant supply and demand
information, only the expected sign and magnitude of the coefficient are
expected to change
With (K) in the denominator, the numerator (U) is bifurcated into (DU) + (EX)
(see equation 7)
(DU/K) now represents the domestic-use-to-stocks ratio

2.

–

EX/K

1.

(EX/K), now its own variable (see above), represents the exports-to-stocks ratio

–

RFS * Dum0618

1.

The renewable fuels standard (RFS) is the most disruptive, ongoing agriculture
policy to hit the corn market since 1996
The legislation was introduced in 2005, but did not take effect until 2006, thus
a time dummy is added which marries the variable to a new era (2006 – 2018)

2.

Corn Price Model (2018):
(9) Ln (p) = a + b Ln (LR) * Dum7885 + c Dum86 + d CCC * Dum7596 + e Ln (DU/K)
+ f Ln (EX/K) + g RFS * Dum0618

Where p represents the annual farm-level price for corn; K is total stocks; DU is domestic annual
utilization; CCC represents government-owned stocks; LR is the commodity loan rate; EX is
annual exports; RFS is the mandated corn ethanol volume; Dum7885 represents a dummy variable
equal to 1 between 1978 and 1985 and equal to 0 in other years; Dum86 represents a dummy
variable equal to 1 in 1986 and equal to 0 in other years; Dum7596 represents a dummy variable
equal to 1 between 1975 and 1996 and equal to 0 in other years; and Dum0618 represents a dummy
variable equal to 1 between 2006 and 2018 and equal to 0 in other years . Full variable definitions
are summarized in table 6.

Table 6: Corn Price Model (2018) Summary of Variable Definitions
Variable Name

Definition

CCC
DU/K
Dum0618
Dum7885
Dum86
EX/K
K
LR
p
RFS
U

Government-owned stocks
Annual U.S. total domestic use-to-stocks ratio
Dummy variable equal to 1 in 2006-18 and equal to 0 in other years
Dummy variable equal to 1 in 1978-85 and equal to 0 in other years
Dummy variable equal to 1 in 1986 and equal to 0 in other years
Annual U.S. total corn exports-to-stocks ratio
Total year-ending U.S. stocks for corn
Commodity loan rate for corn
Annual average farm level price for corn
Required corn-ethanol volume by year
Annual U.S. utilization, including exports

Corn Price Model (2018) Expectations
Expectations for the new model diverge from the original in several key areas. Namely, because
the (K/U) variable from the original model is transformed into (DU/K) and (EX/K), the sign of the
coefficients are expected to be positive—where previously they would have been negative. In the
original configuration, an increase in the stocks-to-use ratio indicates an increase in supply relative
to demand—which would depress prices. As (K/U) becomes (U/K), the coefficients for both
domestic use-to-stocks (DU/K) and exports-to-stocks (EX/K) are expected to be positive. As
demand increases relative to supply, price is expected to increase. The (RFS) coefficient is also
expected to be positive. A persistent demand hike like the ethanol mandate is expected to drive
prices upward, reinforcing the assumption that increased demand relative to supply positively
impacts price. As with the original estimation, the loan rate (LR) coefficient is expected to be
positive. This expectation falls in line with the purpose of the loan rate program (and other price
support programs) which propelled the domestic corn market between the 1970s and 1980s. The
expected sign of the coefficient on the 1986 dummy is negative, as this moment in time marks a
shift away from high price supports toward a more market-oriented agricultural economy. Finally,
the (CCC) coefficient is expected to be positive. This follows the logic that government-held
reserves were not available to the market and thus represented a sort of paucity for grain during
the lifetime of the program. As government stores increase, it is expected that prices increase in
tandem.
The new model is estimated over three different periods, but the expected signs of the coefficients
across each estimation remain the same. The results from the 1975 to 2018 estimation are reported
18

in table 8, the results from the 1975 to 1996 estimation are reported in table 9, and the results from
the 1997 to 2018 estimation are reported in table 10.

IX. Corn Price Model (2018) Results and Properties
Corn Price Model (2018) Results Across Three Periods
For brevity, the coefficients from each new model estimation are reported in table 7. The signs of
the coefficients align with expectations in all cases except two. In the 1975 to 2018 estimation and
the 1997 to 2018 estimation, the coefficient on exports-to-use variable is negative.
Counterintuitively, this implies that corn prices decrease following a 1 percent increase in corn
exports over both periods. However, the p-value for exports-to-use between 1975 to 2018 is .8
(insignificant) and the p-value for exports-to-use between 1997 to 2018 is .25 (insignificant), so
we forgo any interpretation of that variable—intuitive or not. All other coefficients across all
timelines produce significant results that align with expectations from the previous section.
The combined estimation, between 1975 and 2018, delivers a high enough adjusted R Square to
support the merits of the China trade argument on its own. However, the adjusted R Square from
the split estimations each deliver a higher R Square than the combined estimation. The 1975 to
1996 estimation delivers an adjusted R Square of .88 which indicates that 88 percent of the
variation in corn price between 1975 and 1996 can be attributed to movement in the new
explanatory variables. The R Square for this period is .91—slightly higher than the initial Westcott
and Hoffman regression. This implies that the new corn price model captures the effects of the
independent variables in price at least as well as the original model. The variable of greatest
importance to this report—the exports-to-stocks ratio— delivers a significant p-value over this
period. Additionally, the sign of the coefficient is positive which falls in line with two critical
assumptions: 1) exports and corn price share a significant relationship between 1975 and 1996 and
2) a 1 percent increase in exports resulted in a .12 percent increase in price over the same period.
However, this relationship does not hold into the second estimation period.
The Adjusted R Square between 1997 and 2018 is .86 which indicates that 86 percent of the
variation in corn price between 1997 and 2018 can be attributed to movement in the new
explanatory variables. Significantly, the only variable that does not deliver a significant p-value is
the exports-to-stocks variable. This implies that exports-to-use is not a significant driver of corn
price movement over the latter estimation period. Even if the p-value was significant, its sign
(negative) runs counter to our intuition about the relationship between exports in price. The results
from this estimation read: a 1 percent increase in corn exports results in a .23% decrease in corn
prices. This violates the basic assumption that increased demand relative to supply (proxied in the
new model by domestic use plus exports) elevates price.
All three models were tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test in R. The test
statistics across all periods suggest a paucity of evidence to reject the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity. That is to say, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. This
implies that the high adjusted R Squares from each model are not spuriously delivered by some
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unknown relationship within the error terms. While this is not usually a problem with time series
data, it is important to consider any factor that could instigate a misinterpretation of the data.

Table 7: New Model Estimation Results Across Three Periods
1975 to 2018

1975 to 1996

1997 to 2018

.82

.88

.86

Adjusted R Square
Coefficients
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p-value

Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients
0.4817839

p-value

Intercept

0.13989835

0.32584779

0.5380373

7.1119E-06

0.06421419

Ln (LR) * Dum7885

0.32975538

0.00030477

0.22735327

1.616E-05

–

–

86 Dummy

-0.3820236

0.07365488

-0.3345696

0.00171704

–

–

Ln (DU/K)

0.42035668

9.5946E-05

0.16085946

0.02221575

0.79534283

8.5757E-05

Ln (EX/K)

-0.0221757

0.80270603

0.1188149

0.0576508

-0.2313392

0.24949408

CCC * Dum7596

0.00037578

0.00976791

0.00021664

0.00487412

–

RFS * Dum0618

9.2201E-05

2.2217E-07

–

–

7.2426E-05

–
0.00086374

Table 8: Corn Price Model (2018) Estimation and Results 1975 – 2018

Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.9208308

R Square

0.84792937

Adjusted R Square

0.82326927

Standard Error

0.13902433

Observations

44

ANOVA
df

SS

MS

Regression

6

3.98747235

0.66457872

Residual

37

0.7151273

0.01932776

Total

43

4.70259965

Coefficients

Standard
Error

t Stat

F
34.3846652

P-value

Significance
F
1.0797E-13

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

Lower
95.0%

Upper 95.0%

Intercept

0.13989835

0.14049791

0.9957326

0.32584779

-0.1447775

0.42457415

-0.1447775

0.42457415

Ln (LR) * Dum7885

0.32975538

0.08275

3.98495922

0.00030477

0.16208795

0.49742281

0.16208795

0.49742281

86 Dummy

-0.3820236

0.20751167

-1.840974

0.07365488

-0.8024822

0.03843499

-0.8024822

0.03843499

Ln (DU/K)

0.42035668

0.09612849

4.37286254

9.5946E-05

0.22558185

0.6151315

0.22558185

0.6151315

Ln (EX/K)

-0.0221757

0.08812204

-0.2516475

0.80270603

-0.2007279

0.15637652

-0.2007279

0.15637652

CCC * Dum7596

0.00037578

0.00013791

2.7247599

0.00976791

9.6341E-05

0.00065522

9.6341E-05

0.00065522

RFS * Dum0618

9.2201E-05

1.4557E-05

6.3336709

2.2217E-07

6.2705E-05

0.0001217

6.2705E-05

0.0001217

*** If the p-value is < 1%
** If the p-value is < 5%
* If the p-value is < 10%
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Table 9: Corn Price Model (2018) Estimation and Results 1975 – 1996

Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.95372131

R Square

0.90958434

Adjusted R Square

0.88132944

Standard Error

0.05926129

Observations

22

ANOVA
df

SS

MS

F
32.1920981

Regression

5

0.56527718

0.11305544

Residual

16

0.0561904

0.0035119

Total

21

0.62146758

Coefficients

Standard
Error

t Stat

P-value

Significance
F
8.3285E-08

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

Lower
95.0%

Upper
95.0%

Intercept ***

0.5380373

0.08257106

6.51605213

7.1119E-06

0.36299448

0.71308012

0.36299448

0.71308012

Ln (LR) * Dum7885 ***

0.22735327

0.03744057

6.07237802

1.616E-05

0.14798282

0.30672373

0.14798282

0.30672373

86 Dummy ***

-0.3345696

0.08901915

-3.7584007

0.00171704

-0.5232818

-0.1458575

-0.5232818

-0.1458575

Ln (DU/K) **

0.16085946

0.06354175

2.53155524

0.02221575

0.02615696

0.29556195

0.02615696

0.29556195

Ln (EX/K) *

0.1188149

0.05809618

2.04514152

0.0576508

-0.0043435

0.2419733

-0.0043435

0.2419733

CCC * Dum7596 ***

0.00021664

6.6371E-05

3.26410818

0.00487412

7.5942E-05

0.00035734

7.5942E-05

0.00035734

*** If the p-value is < 1%
** If the p-value is < 5%
* If the p-value is < 10%
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Table 10: Corn Price Model (2018) Estimation and Results 1997 – 2018

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square

0.93611933
0.8763194

Adjusted R Square

0.85570596

Standard Error

0.15122045

Observations

22

ANOVA
df
Regression

SS

MS

3

2.91644885

0.97214962

Residual

18

0.41161722

0.02286762

Total

21

3.32806607

Coefficient
s

Standard
Error

t Stat

F
42.5120531

P-value

Significance
F
2.2496E-08

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

Lower 95.0%

Upper 95.0%

Intercept *

-0.4817839

0.2443507

-1.9716903

0.06421419

-0.9951457

0.03157785

-0.9951457

0.03157785

Ln (DU/K) ***

0.79534283

0.15790937

5.03670457

8.5757E-05

0.46358756

1.1270981

0.46358756

1.1270981

Ln (EX/K)

-0.2313392

0.1943977

-1.1900307

0.24949408

-0.6397536

0.17707519

-0.6397536

0.17707519

RFS * Dum0618 ***

7.2426E-05

1.8164E-05

3.98739432

0.00086374

3.4265E-05

0.00011059

3.4265E-05

0.00011059

*** If the p-value is < 1%
** If the p-value is < 5%
* If the p-value is < 10%

X.

Conclusion

The results from the new model estimation between 1975 and 1996 indicate that the updated
variables from Westcott and Hoffman’s model provide a sound foundation for modern corn price
analysis. Extending this renovated model into the future, we discover that U.S. exports did not
have a significant effect on the annual average farm level price for corn between 1997 and 2018.
Therefore, corn exports to any specific destination, as a particle of total exports, would have
similarly insignificant effects on corn price over that period.
This new analysis undermines the foundation of the argument posed by the NGFA, NAEGA,
export groups, and producers around the country’s trade dispute with China in late 2013. While
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the corn market did drop in 2013, and while China did impose a moratorium of all new corn
imports from the U.S. in the same year, the corn market did not drop because of China’s
moratorium. The market could not have dropped because of this minor trade event because 1)
aggregate exports actually increased between MY 2012/2013 and MY 2014/2015 and 2) as this
analysis shows, aggregate exports do not have a significant effect on corn price one way or the
other between 1997 and 2018.

XI.

Future Research

While this analysis adds a new perspective to the corn price canon, it is yet incomplete. Future
research could examine the policies and global conditions that caused the pervasive decrease in
U.S. corn exports as a percentage of total use beginning in the mid 1970s. Future research could
also examine the extent to which China’s own price support programs and corn production
dynamics affected its decision to halt imports of U.S. corn after 2013.
An extension of this report could introduce other factors that may explain the dramatic decrease in
corn prices in late 2013—specifically, it could estimate the rate of decay of the effect of the severe
U.S. drought on corn prices between 2012 and 2014. Also, multiple applications of Chow’s test
could reveal a more precise break period between the late 1990s and the early mid-2000s.
Finally, a new curation of the model could express (DU/K) plus (EX/K) instead as (DU + ROW)/K
plus (CH/K) where (DU + ROW) represents total domestic use plus total exports to rest of world
except China proportional to total stocks, and where (CH/K) represents total exports to China
proportional to total stocks. A rigorous examination of the effect of corn exports to China on
domestic farm-level price would once and for all compromise the assumption that the trade event
in 2013 had a pervasive, negative effect on the U.S. corn market. However, this step seems
redundant and would only serve to drive home a point clearly made by the broader argument that
corn exports as a whole had no significant effect on price between 1997 and 2018.
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